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NOTES
FAMILY LAW-FEDERAL COURTS-No FEDERAL JURISDICTION
UNDER THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT. Thompson
v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
Susan Thompson filed a petition for divorce with the Los Ange-
les superior court in July 1978 to dissolve her marriage to David
Thompson. Susan's petition also sought custody of the couple's son
Matthew. The superior court initially issued an order providing for
joint custody of Matthew. The court subsequently modified the order
to give visitation rights to David and sole custody to Susan because of
her intention to move to Louisiana. The order granting sole custody
to Susan was subject to review pending the completion of a custody
investigation to be performed by the court investigator.
In March of 1981, three months after Susan and Matthew moved
to Louisiana, Susan filed a petition in Louisiana seeking enforcement
of the California decree granting her sole custody of Matthew. Susan
also sought to modify the visitation arrangement, claiming that David
abused and mistreated Matthew. On April 7, 1981, the Louisiana
court awarded sole custody of Matthew to Susan. Subsequently, the
California court awarded sole custody to David after reviewing the
investigator's custody report.
Without first requesting the Louisiana court to recognize the
California order, David filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California. The complaint sought a
declaration that the California order was valid, and an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of the Louisiana decree pursuant to the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA).' Holding that
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Susan were
lacking, the district court granted Susan's motion to dismiss the com-
plaint.2 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that subject matter and personal jurisdiction existed, but affirmed the
dismissal on the ground that David did not have a federal cause of
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
2. Civ. Action No. 83-5221 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 1984) (cited in Thompson v. Thompson,
108 S. Ct. 513, 515-16 (1988)).
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action under the PKPA.3 Facing a split of authority among the cir-
cuits concerning a federal cause of action under the PKPA, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.4 The Court held
that the PKPA does not contain an implied cause of action for a fed-
eral determination of an interstate custody jurisdiction dispute.
Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
Requesting a state court to honor a custody decree rendered by
another state presents substantial difficulty for a litigant involved in a
custody dispute. In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey5 the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution6 protects custody decrees of
one state from modification by another. The Court held that the full
faith and credit clause requires a state to use the same standards in
modifying a decree as the state that issued the decree.7 Therefore,
because the custody decree could be modified by the original state,
another state may subsequently modify the decree in the same man-
ner.' Justice Rutledge, concurring, recognized the effect of the ruling,
observing that it could "set up an unseemly litigious competition be-
tween the states and their respective courts as well as between
parents." 9
The federal courts have traditionally denied jurisdiction to child
custody disputes in complaints brought under diversity jurisdiction.
In an early decision construing the extent of diversity jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court held that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over divorce or alimony cases.1 ° In In re Burrus 1 the
Court, in dicta, placed custody disputes under the domestic relations
exception to diversity jurisdiction.'2 Thus, prior to the enactment of
3. Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986).
4. 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
5. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the...
judicial proceedings of every other State.") See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
7. 330 U.S. at 614.
8. Id. at 615. See also Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (custody decree is not final
because a court may modify the decree if the child's needs change); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356
U.S. 604 (1958) (subsequent state may modify custody decree based on changed circumstances
since the original state could modify on that basis).
9. 330 U.S. at 620 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
10. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) ("We disclaim altogether any
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance
of alimony ....").
11. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
12. Id. at 594 ("As to the right to the control and possession of this child ... it is one in
regard to which neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority of the United
[Vol. 11:97
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the PKPA, resolution of custody disputes lay within the judicial sys-
tems of the states.
Piecemeal adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act' 3 (UCCJA) was the first significant state response to the problem
of interstate custody disputes. The UCCJA designated four circum-
stances under which a court may exercise its jurisdiction to decide a
child custody matter.14 The purpose of the UCCJA was to "bring
some semblance of order into the existing chaos" resulting from juris-
diction disputes. 5 Because the full faith and credit clause does not
resolve custody determinations, each state could use its own judgment
in deciding whether to modify another state's custody decree.' 6 The
States has any special jurisdiction."). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609 (1975).
13. 9 U.L.A. 111-70 (1979) (codified in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-13-201 to -228 (1987)).
14. UCCJA 3(a)-(c), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979) provides:
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters
has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification de-
cree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months before com-
mencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume juris-
diction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in this State
substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, train-
ing, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been aban-
doned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or
dependent]; or
(4)(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has de-
clined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in
this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child custody determi-
nation.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for ju-
risdiction to determine his custody.
Id.
15. 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979).
16. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966) (Arizona
granted custody to mother after she took child from Texas where father had custody); Moniz
v. Moniz, 142 Cal. App. 2d 527, 298 P.2d 710 (1956) (California gave custody to father after
wife had obtained custody under a New Mexico decree); DiGiorgio v. DiGiorgio, 153 Fla. 24,
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UCCJA, however, did not resolve the jurisdiction dilemma. The
broad provisions for jurisdiction 7 allowed state courts to continue to
exercise custody jurisdiction even though another state claimed juris-
diction under the UCCJA.'8 One state may claim home state jurisdic-
tion while another may claim substantial evidence jurisdiction.' 9
Thus, two states could render conflicting custody orders based on the
jurisdiction provisions of the UCCJA.
Against this history of uncertainty in custody decrees, Congress
enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) in 1980.20
The PKPA was designed to provide federal guidance in settling cus-
tody jurisdiction disputes by requiring that full faith and credit be
given to the decree of another state with proper jurisdiction. 21  The
PKPA largely incorporates the jurisdictional requirements of the
13 So. 2d 596 (1943) (Florida exercised jurisdiction over custody of child even though father
kidnapped the child from California where mother initiated a divorce and custody proceed-
ing); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 Ill. App. 2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966) (Illinois granted custody to
grandparents upon request of father while Texas granted mother exclusive custody); Batchelor
v. Fulcher, 415 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1967) (mother allowed to litigate custody in Kentucky
although father had custody under Indiana decree); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 288
N.Y.S.2d 44, 235 N.E.2d 109 (1967) (mother given custody by New York although father had
custody under Maryland decree). Every state has now adopted a version of the UCCJA. See
9 U.L.A. 31-32 (Supp. 1988).
17. UCCJA 3(a), 9 U.L.A. 122 (1979).
18. See Lansing and Sherman, The Legal Response to Child Snatching, 7 J. Juv. L. 16, 22
(1983); See also Note, The PKPA: Application and Interpretation, 23 J. FAM. L. 419, 421
(1985).
19. See Note, Parental Kidnapping in Arkansas Under the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 10 UALR L.J. 69, 75 (1987-88) (noting
Sanders v. Sanders, 1 Ark. App. 216, 615 S.W.2d 375 (1981) where Arkansas claimed signifi-
cant connection/substantial evidence jurisdiction while California claimed home state jurisdic-
tion); See also Peery v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. App. 3d 1085, 219 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1985)
(Louisiana claimed home state and significant connections jurisdiction while California
claimed home state jurisdiction); Dykes v. Dykes, 395 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(although Maryland had home state jurisdiction, Florida exercised jurisdiction); Hadley v.
Hadley, 394 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1981) (Louisiana exercised significant connection jurisdic-
tion when Rhode Island was the child's home state); Potter v. Potter, 104 Misc. 2d 930, 430
N.Y.S.2d 201 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980) (Wisconsin claimed home state jurisdiction while New
York claimed significant connection jurisdiction); Scheafnocker v. Scheafnocker, 356 Pa.
Super. 118, 514 A.2d 172 (1986) (Texas claimed home state jurisdiction while Pennsylvania
claimed substantial evidence jurisdiction); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 719 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) (Texas yields jurisdiction to North Carolina after both trial courts claimed
home state jurisdiction).
20. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing
on S. 105 Before the Sub-Comm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1980) [hereinafter PKPA Hearing] (statement of Senator
Cranston).
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UCCJA that govern a court exercising initial jurisdiction.22 A court
has jurisdiction under the PKPA if it has jurisdiction under state
law,23 and if: (1) the state is the home state of the child,24 or (2) there
is no home state, and the child and a parent have a significant connec-
tion with the state which contains substantial evidence bearing on
custody,25 or (3) the child was abandoned in the state, 26 or (4) no
other state has jurisdiction, or, if another state had jurisdiction, it has
relinquished jurisdiction.27
The PKPA gives preference to home state jurisdiction but allows
significant connections/substantial evidence jurisdiction if no state
has home state jurisdiction. 2  Further, under the PKPA, a state court
cannot modify a custody decree while another state has jurisdiction
unless that state declines to exercise jurisdiction. 29 Finally, the PKPA
provides that the state with proper initial jurisdiction retains jurisdic-
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(I)-(2)(D) (1982); See supra note 14. The PKPA follows the
jurisdiction system of the UCCJA but preferentially ranks the circumstances for jurisdiction to
avoid simultaneous orders of several states. See infra text accompanying notes 24-28. See also
Note, Child Snatching: Remedies in the Federal Courts, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 195
(1984).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(1).
24. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(A) provides:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the commencement of the pro-
ceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six months before the date of
the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because
of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant
continues to live in such State[.]
Id
25. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) provides:
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A),
and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such State assume jurisdic-
tion because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical presence in
such State, and (II) there is available in such State substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships[.]
Id.
26. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) provides: "(C) the child is physically present in such State and
(i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse[.]"
Id.
27. Id § 1738A(c)(2)(D) provides:
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A),
(B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to deter-
mine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such
court assume jurisdiction.
Id.
28. Id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B) (1982); See Note, supra note 22.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(l)-(2) (1982).
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tion as long as that state continues to be the home state of the child or
either of the parents.3" Thus, if a state has proper initial jurisdiction
under the PKPA when it renders a custody decree, that decree cannot
later be modified by another state as long as the child or either parent
resides in the state which rendered the decree. In this manner the
PKPA makes subsequent decree modifications by other states more
difficult than under the UCCJA. 3' The PKPA, however, does not
expressly authorize federal jurisdiction for the determination of which
of two conflicting state decrees is valid.32
In light of this ambiguity, the federal courts of appeals reached
different decisions on the question of federal jurisdiction under the
PKPA.33 The Third Circuit was one of the first courts to allow a
federal complaint under the PKPA in Flood v. Braaten.3 4 In consid-
ering federal jurisdiction under the PKPA, the court in Flood empha-
sized that a federal court would have a very restricted role under the
PKPA.35 The court ruled that the domestic relations exception to
diversity jurisdiction only applied to diversity complaints and not to
complaints under a federal statute. 36 Thus, the court held that a fed-
eral court may decide which state has PKPA jurisdiction without de-
ciding the underlying custody dispute.37 Construing the silence of the
PKPA as to federal jurisdiction together with the legislative history, 8
30. Id. § 1738A(d) (1982).
31. For a comparison of the UCCJA and PKPA, See Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdic-
tion and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 325-30 (1986).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982) (only orders the state authorities to follow the provisions
of the Act).
33. Several district courts also rendered decisions on whether the PKPA contains a fed-
eral cause of action. Some courts held that the PKPA does not grant federal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Crouse v. Creanza, 658 F. Supp. 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1987); Leyda v. Roach, 650 F. Supp.
951 (S.D. Iowa 1987); Siler v. Storey, 587 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex. 1984). Others, however,
found that the PKPA does contain a federal cause of action. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 638 F.
Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Olmo v. Olmo, 646 F. Supp. 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Martinez v.
Reed, 623 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. La. 1985); Wyman v. Lamer, 624 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Ind.
1985). See also Hoff, Federal Court Remedies in Interstate Child Custody and Parental Kid-
napping Cases, 19 FAM. LAW Q. 443 (1985-86) for a discussion of federal jurisdiction under
the PKPA prior to Thompson.
34. 727 F.2d 303 (3rd Cir. 1984) (New Jersey awarded custody to mother while North
Dakota awarded custody to father).
35. Id. at 306.
36. Id. at 307-08.
37. Id. at 310. The court found a great difference between the full faith and credit statute
and the PKPA. Under the former, a federal court would have to determine whether changed
circumstances existed before it could order a state court to render full faith and credit to a
foreign decree. However, under the PKPA, a federal court would only have to determine
which state complied with the PKPA. In this fashion the federal court, under the PKPA,
would avoid the underlying custody dispute. Id. at 309.
38. PKPA Hearing, supra note 21.
[Vol. 11:97
FAMILY LAW
the court in Flood found that Congress intended for the initial custody
decision to remain in the states- 9 However, the court concluded that
Congress could not have "intended to render [the PKPA] virtually
nugatory" by denying a federal forum to complaints arising under the
PKPA. ° The Third Circuit subsequently reaffirmed the Flood deci-
sion in DiRuggiero v. Rodgers.41
Other circuits subsequently adopted Flood's reasoning and analy-
sis. In Heartfield v. Heartfield,42 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit expressly adopted the Flood analysis and held that the PKPA
grants federal jurisdiction.43 The court, however, reversed a district
court injunction forbidding a party to litigate custody in Louisiana
when Texas was the proper forum under the PKPA." The court re-
versed the injunction because it found that the PKPA requires two
inconsistent state orders before federal jurisdiction under the PKPA
applies.45
Without reaching the question of legislative intent, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in McDougald v. Jenson,4 6 found
that federal question jurisdiction47 resulted from the PKPA even if
Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of action. 48 The
court stated that federal question jurisdiction results when a plaintiff
must "establish ... the correctness and the applicability ... of federal
law."49
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Hickey v. Bax-
ter,5" found with little discussion of the matter, that federal jurisdic-
tion existed under the PKPA.5' The court in Hickey held that the
PKPA allows a federal court to serve as a "referee between conflicting
39. 727 F.2d at 310-11.
40. Id. at 312. The court felt that direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court from
the state courts would be impractical because of the Court's crowded docket.
41. 743 F.2d 1009 (1984) (Flood analysis used to support a jurisdiction claim and tort
claim for interference with custody).
42. 749 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. Id. at 1140-41.
44. Id. at 1139.
45. Id. at 1143. The father attempted to enjoin the wife from litigating custody in Louisi-
ana prior to the issuance of a decree by any Louisiana court.
46. 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1986).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
48. 786 F.2d at 1480.
49. Id. (citing P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 889 (2d ed. 1973)).
50. 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986).
51. Id. at 431. The court held that the domestic relations exception did not apply to an
action under the PKPA, relying on McDougald, Heartfield, and Flood. Id.
1988-89]
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state custody decrees."52  In Meade v. Meade5 3 the Fourth Circuit
reaffirmed its holding that the PKPA established federal
jurisdiction. 4
In contrast, however, the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth, Sev-
enth, and District of Columbia Circuits have expressly stated that the
PKPA does not allow federal question jurisdiction. In Bennett v. Ben-
nett 55 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia briefly re-
viewed the legislative history of the PKPA 56 and found that Congress
did not intend for federal jurisdiction to exist under the PKPA.57
Subsequently, in Rogers v. Platt,58 the same court, engaging in a more
extensive discussion of federal jurisdiction, affirmed its earlier holding
in Bennett. 9 As a prerequisite to federal question jurisdiction," the
court stated that a claim must require resolution of a substantial fed-
eral law question. 6' The court noted, however, that if "Congress af-
firmatively determines that there should be no private federal cause of
action that is effectively the end of the matter."6 2 The court then
found that the legislative history of the PKPA demonstrates that
Congress intended no federal jurisdiction.63 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit has also briefly stated that the PKPA declined to
create a federal remedy.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Thompson 65
also found that Congress did not intend for federal courts to construe
52. Id.
53. 812 F.2d 1473 (4th Cir. 1987).
54. Id. at 1476 (relying on Hickey, McDougald, Heartfield and Flood).
55. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
56. See supra note 21.
57. 682 F.2d at 1043. The court noted that a provision "creating or recognizing a direct
role for the federal courts" was "conspicuously absent" from the PKPA. Id.
58. 814 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 696 n.18.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
61. 814 F.2d at 688 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vaca-
tion Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13 (1983)).
62. Id. (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 106 S. Ct. 3229, 3237
(1986)).
63. Id. at 690-94. The court found that the PKPA was merely an addendum to the full
faith and credit statute which does not contain federal jurisdiction. Id. at 690. The court also
found that Congress rejected alternative proposals to the PKPA which would have established
federal jurisdiction, and that such jurisdiction would involve the federal courts in the underly-
ing custody dispute. Id. at 692-93.
64. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982). The court allowed a diversity based
tort for interference with custody, but stated briefly in dicta that the PKPA did not contain a
federal remedy. Id. at 493.
65. 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the PKPA.6 6 The Thompson court held that federal question jurisdic-
tion exists when a complaint arguably presents a violation of federal
law, unless the complaint is clearly erroneous.67 The court then re-
viewed the PKPA and its legislative history, holding that Congress
did not intend for the PKPA to create a federal cause of action for
which relief could be granted.68
In view of the multiple approaches to the PKPA and the incon-
sistent decisions of the circuit courts, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Thompson 69 to resolve the dilemma of fed-
eral jurisdiction under the PKPA.
In Thompson v. Thompson,7 ° the Court held that the PKPA does
not contain a federal cause of action.7' The Court stated that a cause
of action by implication does not require an express intent in the con-
gressional record.72 Otherwise, the doctrine of implied cause of action
would be limited to "correcting drafting errors" made by Congress.73
The Court stated that congressional intent to create a cause of action
was the crucial consideration, and that intent can be inferred from the
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or the circumstances
of the statute's enactment.74
The Court noted that the history of interstate custody disputes
resulted from the inability of courts to apply full faith and credit to
custody decrees. 75 The UCCJA attempted to alleviate this problem,
66. Id. at 1559.
67. Id. at 1550 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). The court felt that subject
matter jurisdiction existed for a determination on the merits as to whether the complaint stated
a proper cause of action. Id.
68. Id. at 1559. The court viewed the PKPA as an addition to the full faith and credit
statute which contains no federal cause of action. Id. at 1555-56. The court found that Con-
gress rejected alternative proposals to the PKPA that provided for a federal cause of action.
Id. at 1556. The court also expressed the view that a federal cause of action would involve
federal courts in custody determinations contrary to the diversity exception concept. Id. at
1558.
69. 107 S. Ct. 946 (1987).
70. 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
71. Id. at 520.
72. Id. at 516.
73. Id. (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)). The Court rea-
soned that "It]he implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual dead letter" if limited to
situations where Congress clearly intended a cause of action but neglected to provide for one.
Id.
74. Id. The Court cited Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which listed the following as
factors to consider in determining congressional intent:. (1) the class intended to be benefited
by the statute, (2) legislative intent, (3) purpose of the statute, and (4) whether the area is
traditionally dominated by state or federal law. Id. at 78.
75. 107 S. Ct. at 517. The Court noted that a state may modify another state's custody
decree in the same manner as the initial state could modify its own decree. Id.
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but failed." Thus, the Court viewed the PKPA as a federal attempt
to require the states to render full faith and credit to custody de-
crees.77 The Court found this "full faith and credit approach" signifi-
cant because neither the full faith and credit clause nor its statutory
counterpart contains a federal cause of action. 8
Reviewing the legislative history of the Act, the Court found that
Congress clearly did not intend to create a federal cause of action.79
The Court placed special emphasis on Congress' rejection of an alter-
nate proposal to the PKPA which provided for federal jurisdiction. 0
A debate between Congressmen Conyers and Fish demonstrated that
Congress rejected an alternative to the PKPA that contained provi-
sions for federal jurisdiction.8 The alternative would have allowed
federal courts to enforce custody orders under diversity jurisdiction.82
The legislative history also contained a letter to Congress written by
Assistant Attorney General Ward contrasting the various proposals
arguing for the "full faith and credit approach" adopted in the
PKPA.13 The Court concluded that this history provides "strong evi-
dence against inferring a federal cause of action."8 4
The Court also expressed concern that federal jurisdiction under
the PKPA would involve federal courts in the underlying domestic
dispute," and would allow the federal courts to act as regular courts
of appeal from the states.86 The Court stated that it was not prepared
76. Id. The Court viewed the failure of the UCCJA as attributable to the fact that some
states refused to enact it, while others modified its provisions.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 518 (citing Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904)). The
Court noted that the "PKPA ... is an addendum to the full faith and credit statute" and is
titled "Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 518-19 (citing Parental Kidnapping: Hearing on HR. 1290 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1980)). Mr.
Fish felt federal jurisdiction would ease the litigant's task while Mr. Conyers viewed the fed-
eral courts as inexperienced in custody matters. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (citing PKPA: Addendum to Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the SubComm. on
Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Sub-Comm. on Child and
Human Development of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong. 2d
Sess. 104-05 (1980)). The letter argued that federal jurisdiction would over-extend the federal
docket and involve the federal courts in matters of which they have little experience. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 520 n.4. The Court felt that disputes resulting in conflicting state decrees would




to presume that state courts would not enforce the PKPA. 7
Application of the Court's decision in Thompson is clear. A par-
ent facing two conflicting custody decrees cannot rely on federal juris-
diction under the PKPA to resolve the custody entanglement.
However, the effect of Thompson remains unclear. Whether or not a
lack of federal jurisdiction under the PKPA will render it useless, as
suggested by some, 8 depends on the interpretation that the state
courts give to the PKPA. The provisions of the PKPA restrict the
ability of a court to modify an existing custody decree, resolving some
of the difficulty present in the UCCJA. The critical question is
whether state courts will apply a strict interpretation to the provisions
of the PKPA. 9 A strict application of the PKPA, with consideration
given to its underlying policy, would prevent its circumvention. The
very existence of cases such as Thompson indicate that some states
either do not apply the PKPA strictly or do not apply it in relation to
its policy of preventing child kidnapping.
Thompson leaves the policy and effectiveness of the PKPA to the
states. A parent involved in a child custody dispute should expressly
raise the PKPA before the state court. A party should also argue the
policy considerations of the PKPA as well as the particular jurisdic-
tional sections. Such use of the PKPA may allow a litigant to avoid
flexible readings of the UCCJA because the PKPA, as a federal stat-
ute, controls the custody question under the supremacy clause.9°
Raising the PKPA custody question in a state court is also important
in the event a petition for certiorari is made to the United States
Supreme Court.9'
In view of the legislative history of the PKPA, the Court's deci-
sion in Thompson was technically correct. However, the lack of fed-
eral jurisdiction greatly reduces the possible effectiveness of the
PKPA. The developing line of cases which allowed federal jurisdic-
tion provided a readily accessible forum for resolution of child cus-
tody disputes. Even if states strictly comply with the PKPA, a parent
is now limited to the expensive and time consuming task of arguing
before a foreign state court for this compliance. Thus, the Court's
87. Id. at 520. The Court felt there was no reason to believe the state courts would refuse
to apply the PKPA since the states apply the full faith and credit statute every day. Id.
88. Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 310-11 (3rd Cir. 1984). See supra text accompanying
note 40.
89. Note, supra note 19 at 81 (Arkansas strictly applies the provisions of the PKPA).
90. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. See Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493 (1981) (wife failed to bring federal issue before state
court, resulting in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction).
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decision greatly increases the hardship of a litigant involved in a juris-
dictional battle between two states by denying the aid of federal
courts.
Until Congress decides to re-evaluate the role of the federal court
under the PKPA, a litigant in such a dispute is limited to actions in
state courts and to certiorari. In the state courts it is essential to ar-
gue the provisions and policy of the PKPA. However, the ultimate
question of the effectiveness of the PKPA will depend on whether the
state courts will attempt to fully comply with the language and policy
of the PKPA.
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